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Introduction 
In the following I wish to draw your attention to two related 
ideas that occur in Wittgenstein’s later writings. In making 
this emphasis I am at the same time claiming a certain 
continuity in Wittgenstein’s thought – a continuity of a quite 
particular kind. The argument that I shall present in the 
following can be summarised under three points: 1. in both 
his early and his late writings, Wittgenstein makes a 
natural-historical claim that, as humans, we are picture-
creating and picture-using creatures; 2. the crucial analogy 
between the picture and the sentence that appears in the 
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is retained in Wittgen-
stein’s later descriptions of language; and 3. the use of this 
analogy serves two diametrically opposed purposes when 
considered in relation to religious language, whereby the 
earlier use determines the propositions of natural science 
and delimits these from religious propositions, and the later 
use of the analogy provides the impetus for a grammatical 
investigation of religious language and religious beliefs. 
1. Man – a picture-using creature 
In neither the Notebooks 1916-1918 nor in the Tractatus 
does Wittgenstein offer any argument for, or investigation 
of, the particular quality or ability that enables human 
beings to perform the experimental putting together (TLP 
4.031) or constructing (TLP 4.023) of names in accordance 
with the criteria for logical description implied by the theory 
of representation. Instead, he simply affirms, in November 
1914, that „[w]e can make ourselves a picture of it [a 
situation] [Wir können uns ein Bild von ihm machen]“ (NB, 
24). The wording of this remark allows us to regard it as a 
crucial premise underlying the theory of representation in 
the early philosophy. In essence, this premise is that 
humans are by definition picture-using creatures. This 
implies in turn that we are naturally inclined to create 
language, whereby the essential quality of language is 
assumed to be that it depicts the things that exist and the 
ways in which these are mutually related to one another. It 
is assumed that this kind of representation is achieved in 
virtue of the human ability to create such pictures in 
accordance with the criteria for logical representation. This 
premise is put forward anew four years later in the 
introductory remarks that summarise the representational 
theory of the picture (TLP 2.1-2.12). – „We make to 
ourselves pictures [[w]ir machen uns Bilder] of facts“ (TLP 
2.1). Here as well the premise has the form of a natural-
historical assertion to the effect that, in anthropological 
terms, humans are picture-creating creatures. Somewhat 
earlier, in October 1913, when also framing linguistic 
philosophical reflections within a natural-historical 
perspective, he wrote: „Man possesses an innate capacity 
for constructing symbols“ (NB, 100; TLP 4.002). The use of 
the verb „make/machen“ in the two assertions just quoted 
encapsulates the account of sentence formation as an 
experimental putting together or constructing of names. 
The verb emphasises the human activity of creating 
pictures. With this emphasis in mind, it is worth noting that 
the corresponding summary of the picture theory in the 
Prototractatus implies a broader natural-historical field, for 
in that context Wittgenstein also asserts that humans 
perceive, understand and grasp propositions and facts in 
the world as (logical) pictures; or, as he puts it: „Facts are 
grasped by us [begreifen wir] in pictures“ (PT 2.1). This 
also means that, in more general terms we should speak 
of humans as picture-perceiving creatures. It is these 
natural-historical facts that Wittgenstein presupposes 
despite his failure to investigate the question in depth: 
what is it that enables us to form pictures (thought as 
logical picture (TLP 3); proposition as (logical) picture (TLP 
4.021)) of states of affairs? 
Wittgenstein returns to the picture concept again after 
1929, when it is integrated into and modified to suit his 
new account of language. One of the more prominent 
formulations in this regard is that, among the countless 
and diverse uses of language, there are certain forms of 
expression that can be described or classified as pictures. 
This claim is worded in a variety of ways that could in fact 
be confused with the earlier formulations of the assumed 
natural-historical premise that underlies the picture theory. 
In MSS 116 and 120, for example, he says that many of 
the difficulties (Schwierigkeiten) that we encounter and 
have to contend with in philosophical work result from the 
situation „that we make pictures for ourselves [dass wir 
uns Bilder machen]“ (MS 116, 162; MS 120, 26); these 
pictures often tempt or encourage us to expect that words 
have some other use than they commonly have in 
everyday life. In the first half of MS 115 he says more 
generally: „To make pictures for ourselves is part of our life 
[uns Bilder zu machen ist Teil unseres Lebens]“ (MS 115, 
93). 
Judging by this kind of formulation, it would appear that 
Wittgenstein adhered to his natural-historical premise, that 
we are picture-creating, or picture-using (Z '381) creatures. 
The reason for saying it would appear so is not least that 
the premise is only put forward in a weakened form; on the 
one hand, the forms of expression that are described as 
pictures cannot be equated with the pictures of represen-
tational logic of the Tractatus, and on the other, since the 
thesis only applies to certain or particular forms of 
expression, it cannot be regarded as extensively applica-
ble to all language uses, as was the case in the early 
philosophy. Thus the premise is retained but only in a 
limited sense, insofar as it is posited in relation to a 
characteristic of certain elements or features of language 
use. – „The various positions [[d]ie verschiedenen Stellen] 
that a picture can assume in a theory (or in any kind of 
language game)“ (MS 116, 226). – Features that are 
closely associated with other forms of language, such as 
physical gestures and reactions. In several contexts 
Wittgenstein is more precise in specifying the principal 
elements or features of language that the picture concept 
relates to, and these happen to be a relatively limited 
range of expressive forms together with their ideas and 
conceptions. I shall mention a few examples: „It is quite 
clear that the way of talking about [die Ausdrucksweise 
vom] memory as a picture is merely a picture“ (MS 108, 
33-34); „[A] certain picture, a certain idea [[E]in gewisses 
Bild, eine gewisse Idee]“ (MS 115, 205); „A new arithmeti-
cal technique should provide us with a new picture, a new 
form of expression [ein neues Bild liefern, eine neue 
Ausdrucksweise]“ (MS 121, 129); „You have a picture. (A 
form of expression.) [Du hast ein Bild. (Eine Ausdrucks-
weise.)]“ (MS 121, 3). 




2. The analogy – picture and sentence 
With this focus in mind it becomes relevant to ask, what is 
it about such forms of expression that permits us to regard 
them as pictures? Or, what is the basis for retaining the 
analogy between sentence and picture in the late works? 
At no point does Wittgenstein argue in any depth for 
reintroducing the picture concept, and in a sense it might 
seem surprising that he should retain such a central 
element of his early philosophy, since many of the ideas 
that are presupposed by this reuse of the concept stand in 
conflict to the earlier ideas about logical representation. No 
justification for the reintroduction of the concept is given in 
Philosophical Investigations, although one is sketched in 
the Big Typescript. In a brief section of Chapter 21 entitled 
„Ähnlichkeit von Satz und Bild“ he says: „In what sense 
can I say, the sentence is a picture [[i]n welchem Sinne 
kann ich sagen, der Satz sei ein Bild]? When I think about 
it I wish to say: it must be a picture if it is to show me what 
I should do, if it is to let me act in accordance with it. But 
then what you want to say is that you act in accordance 
with it in the same sense in which you act in accordance 
with a picture. [Y] To say that the sentence is a picture 
highlights certain features in the grammar of the word 
‘sentence’. [Zu sagen, dass der Satz ein Bild ist, hebt 
gewisse Züge in der Grammatik des Wortes „Satz“ 
hervor.]“ (TS 213, 83). 
Apart from the point that the reintroduction of the con-
cept serves a heuristic purpose, Wittgenstein claims that 
the basis for retaining the picture concept is the insight that 
what is entailed in understanding, acting upon or acting on 
the background of a sentence is closely related to what is 
entailed in understanding, acting upon or acting on the 
background of a picture. To put it another way, our attitude 
towards and our use of certain forms of expression in 
language is in many respects analogous to our attitude 
towards and use of pictures. But can we say more 
precisely what aspects of approach and use (of sentence 
and picture) it is that are being equated? Only a few are 
suggested. Two are mentioned in the Big Typescript: (a) a 
semantic aspect: in many contexts the semantic content of 
a picture is like that of a linguistic description – „I can 
translate the description of the garden into a picture [ein 
gemaltes Bild], and the picture into a description“ (TS 213, 
83); and (b) a functional aspect: in many contexts a picture 
can prompt the same reactions as a linguistic description – 
„When the ugliness of a person affects us as repellent, it 
can do so in a picture, just as it can in a description, in 
words“ (TS 213, 86). A third point of comparison is found in 
Zettel: (c) a discursive aspect: a picture, like a sentence, 
allows certain inferences or conclusions to be drawn – „Of 
course a picture in which the face smiles does not shew 
how it looks when weeping. But it does permit inferences“ 
(Z '514). And finally there is (d) an explicative aspect: in 
many contexts a picture can play the same role as a 
linguistic explanation – „Take ‘God created Man’. Pictures 
of Michelangelo showing the creation of the world. In 
general, there is nothing which explains the meanings of 
words as well as pictures“ (LCA, 63). 
The linguistic forms of expression – or of certain combi-
nations of linguistic forms (PG, 170) – which Wittgenstein 
refers to as pictures can more generally be divided into two 
main groups: (A) particular linguistic forms of expression 
(pictures): here we are concerned with the afore-men-
tioned combinations of linguistic concepts, whose scope of 
application is limited to rather special or narrow fields of 
use; in this context, the picture (concept combination) 
refers to, for example, (Ai) a certain imaginative concep-
tion, such as there being a logical connection between a 
person’s handwriting and that person’s character (CE, 410-
411; LFM, 239), and (Aii) a comprehensive or synoptic 
overview, such as a historic summary of developments in 
mathematics, which – as he puts it in the Investigations – 
can give „a rough picture“ (PI '23) of the conceptual 
changes. 
But following this, we find another main group, where the 
analogy between the sentence and the picture is used in 
conjunction with (B) constitutive or organisational linguistic 
forms of expression (pictures). Here we are dealing with 
combinations of linguistic terms that determine others, or 
that determine the formation of new linguistic combina-
tions; in this case, the linguistic combination (the picture) 
is, as it were, decisive for the forms and categories of 
thought and is therefore to be regarded as a conceptual 
frame, which determines partly the way in which the world 
is perceived and comprehended (the picture establishes 
certain habits of thought), and partly the space within 
which criteria are determined for the meaningfulness of a 
term’s application. Thus we are concerned here with those 
combinations of terms (pictures) that broadly constitute, on 
the one hand, a (normative) conceptual perspective („eine 
Denkform“ (TS 220, 72)), and on the other, the ultimate 
(internal) authority for that conceptual perspective 
(justificatory authority). Our language and inherited habits 
of thought (Denkgewohnheiten) should therefore also be 
regarded as having developed in conjunction „with the 
oldest pictures [mit den ältesten Bildern]“ (TS 211, 398). 
As examples of such constitutive or organisational pictures 
– „a picture which is at the root of all our thinking [ein Bild 
am Grunde alles Denkens]“ (CV, 83) – we are given 
Augustine’s account of language (PI '1), the definitions of 
mathematics (LFM, 112) and its proofs (LFM, 55), and 
natural scientist’s or physicists theories about the most 
basic constituents of the world. In relation to the latter, 
Wittgenstein writes: „You are taking for granted the 
atomistic picture. What does this come to? We are so used 
to this picture that it’s as thought we had all seen atoms. 
Every educated eight-year old child knows that things are 
made of atoms. We would think it lack of education if a 
person didn’t think of a rod as being made of atoms“ (LCA, 
17). 
3. A picture – religious language use 
In his „Lectures on Religious Belief“ Wittgenstein links his 
grammatical description of religious belief to the last of the 
concepts of picture mentioned above. He emphasises that 
the representational or expressive form of religious 
language can be regarded as pictorial. Thus he describes 
as pictures linguistic combinations such as „the Last 
Judgement“ (LCA, 53), „God’s eye sees everything“ (LCA, 
71) and „we might see one another after death“ (LCA, 70-
71). 
These lectures would seem to constitute an attempt to 
rethink the distinction between the religious and the scien-
tific use of concepts that formerly appeared in the 
Tractatus and in „A Lecture on Ethics“. And as before, he 
points out the irreconcilability not just of the attitudes, but 
also of the linguistic practices and the orientations towards 
reality that apply in the two forms of discourse. The 
religious approach and sense of conviction are not foun-
ded on scientific method (in an arrangement of hypotheses 
and verifications, in the use of induction and of terms such 
as rational, assumption, probability, knowledge, facts), but 
rather in unshakeable faith, which manifests itself in very 
different linguistic practices. But in what way? And what 
are those linguistic practices? Wittgenstein says: „Suppose 
somebody made this guidance for this life: believing in the 




Last Judgement. Whenever he does anything, this is 
before his mind. [Y] [H]e has what you might call an 
unshakeable belief. It will show, not by reasoning or by 
appeal to ordinary grounds for belief, but rather by regu-
lating for all in his life. This is a very much stronger fact – 
foregoing pleasures, always appealing to this picture“ 
(LCA, 53-54). In short, religious faith manifests itself in 
certain practices that appeal to and are regulated by 
concepts (linguistic combinations) that can be described as 
pictures. 
In the „Lectures on Religious Belief“ he presents neither 
arguments nor even any basic justification for introducing 
the picture concept, nor any detailed account of it; but the 
mention of the role and function that the picture assumes 
allows us to infer that he is thinking here of the above-
mentioned constitutive or organisational aspect of linguistic 
pictures. It is linguistic combinations that underlie the 
thoughts and actions of the religious believer. When we 
study the picture concept in these lectures more closely, it 
appears to possess three essential characteristics. (i) 
Religious concepts and statements (pictures) do not refer 
like empirical sentences (the pictures constitute referential 
linguistic actions that are different in kind from ostensive 
definitions). If we were to show Moore some pictures of a 
tropical plant, at least there is in this case „a technique of 
comparison between picture and plant“ (LCA, 63) that we 
could resort to. But there is no technique of comparison 
when it comes to Michelangelo’s picture of God creating 
Adam. (ii) Combinations of religious terms are pictures that 
cannot be justified. In MS 121 he writes: „You have a 
picture. (A form of expression.) But you cannot justify it. In 
trying to grasp something behind the form of expression, 
you grasp at thin air. [Wie Du hinter die Ausdrucksweise 
zurückgreifen willst, greifst Du in’s Leere.]“ (MS 121, 32). 
And (iii) religious terms and statements (pictures) cannot 
be reduced to or reformulated as emotive or theoretical 
forms of expression, since „[t]he whole weight may be in 
the picture“ (LCA, 72). The semantics of pictures in the 
religious context cannot be replaced by or transformed into 
other forms of expression. The pictures are untranslatable. 
Wittgenstein suggests these three characteristics – the 
picture’s lack of empirical reference, its lack of epistemo-
logical foundations, and its irreducible nature – when he 
writes: „Religious similes can be said to move on the edge 
of an abyss [am Rande des Abgrundes]. [Y] Religion says: 
Do this! – Think like that! – but it cannot justify this“ (CV, 
29). „The similes of the NT [Y] are without foundation [[d]ie 
Gleichnisse des N.T. [Y] sind ohne Boden [var.: ohne 
einen Boden]]“ (MS 162b, 128). 
But haven’t we seen these characteristics somewhere 
before? Indeed we have – in the description in the 
Tractatus of the domain from which the picture concept – 
as it appears in that work – is bounded off, namely the 
mystical, that which lies beyond all empirical happening 
and being-so (TLP 6.41), and which eludes any form either 
of meaningful conceptualisation or description, or of 
empirical or theoretical justification (TLP 6.522). So, to put 
it in a nutshell, the picture concept is a pivotal element 
both in the Tractatus’ logical description of natural-
scientific sentences (that stand in contrast to non-empirical 
religious statements), and in the late Wittgenstein’s 
grammatical investigation of religious sentences (that 
stand in contrast to empirical natural-scientific statements). 
The analogy between the picture and the sentence is used 
in the Tractatus and in the late works (post 1929) in two 
distinct linguistic domains; the late use of the analogy in 
the „Lectures on Religious Belief“ simply lays claim to the 
characteristics from which the picture concept in the 
Tractatus was delimited! 
This is one of the many shifts in his Denkbewegungen 
that Wittgenstein has in mind when in 1944 or later he 
noted: „My account will be hard to follow: because it says 
something new but still has egg-shells from the old view 
sticking to it“ (CV, 44).* 
 
*My thanks to Peter Cripps for his translation of this paper. 
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